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This article critically examines one of the most prevalent metaphors in contemporary biology, namely
the machine conception of the organism (MCO). Although the fundamental differences between or-
ganisms and machines make the MCO an inadequate metaphor for conceptualizing living systems, many
biologists and philosophers continue to draw upon the MCO or tacitly accept it as the standard model of
the organism. The analysis presented here focuses on the speciﬁc difﬁculties that arise when the MCO is
invoked in the contexts of development and evolution. In developmental biology the MCO underlies a
logically incoherent model of ontogeny, the genetic program, which serves to legitimate three prob-
lematic theses about development: genetic animism, neo-preformationism, and developmental
computability. In evolutionary biology the MCO is responsible for grounding unwarranted theoretical
appeals to the concept of design as well as to the interpretation of natural selection as an engineer, which
promote a distorted understanding of the process and products of evolutionary change. Overall, it is
argued that, despite its heuristic value, the MCO today is impeding rather than enabling further progress
in our comprehension of living systems.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences‘Present day biology is the realization of the famousmetaphor of
the organism as a bête-machine elaborated by Descartes in Part V
of the Discours, a realization far beyond what anyone in the
seventeenth centurycouldhave imagined.’ (Lewontin, 2009, p. v)
1. Introduction
Metaphors are generally recognized today as being of funda-
mental importance in science (Brown, 2003; Hallyn, 2000; Keller,
2002). But it was not always that way. Until fairly recently, it had
not been uncommon to assume that language consists of literal and
metaphorical expressions; the former consisting of descriptions
which correspond to ‘the way things are’, and the latter fulﬁlling
the more diversionary and aesthetic purposes of literary writing.
On this view, metaphors were regarded as merely ornamental
ﬁgures of speech that offered little or nothing to the scientiﬁcpursuit of generating accurate knowledge of nature. Over the past
few decades, however, work in cognitive science, linguistics, and
philosophy has precipitated the collapse of the literal/metaphorical
distinction, as it has become apparent that metaphors lie at the
very heart of the pre-linguistic cognitive processes by which we
conceptualize the world (Gibbs, 2008; Kövecses, 2010; Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980). Metaphors are in fact indispensable to the way
concepts are created and ideas are communicated. This has pro-
found implications for how we think about scientiﬁc reasoning and
theorizing.
Scientiﬁc metaphors typically map knowledge of a well-
understood source domain onto a less-understood target domain
so that the unknown is seen through the lens of the known. They
enable scientists to articulate and communicate their ﬁndings by
providing familiar interpretive frameworks in which to make
conceptual sense of new phenomena. A metaphor emphasizes
certain features of the source domain and downplays others. In
doing so, it shapes our theoretical understanding of the target
domain. This provides a stimulus for scientiﬁc research, as it opens
up new perspectives through which to investigate the target
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as they can bias the way inwhich we think about the target domain
and prevent us from directing our attention towards other poten-
tially more productiveways of studying it. So although appealing to
metaphors in scientiﬁc practice may well be inevitable, the choice
of what metaphor is used in any given context matters a great deal.
We can distinguish three major roles for metaphors in science,
namely theoretical, heuristic, and rhetorical functions. Metaphors
with a theoretical function are central to scientiﬁc understanding,
as they provide the foundation for the conceptualization, repre-
sentation, and explanation of the target domain. Metaphors with a
heuristic function are central to scientiﬁc discovery, as they serve as
methodological tools that conveniently abstract or idealize aspects
of the target domain in order to facilitate its empirical investigation.
Finally, metaphors with a rhetorical function are central to scien-
tiﬁc communication, as they act as pedagogical devices that inform
and educate non-specialist audiences about the target domain.
The most pervasive scientiﬁc metaphors perform all three
functions.
One such metaphor is the machine conception of the organism
(MCO, hereafter), which has an illustrious intellectual pedigree
stretching all the way back to René Descartes, and which many
regard today as ‘perhaps the most powerful conceptual tool of
modern biology’ (Konopka, 2002, p. 398). Although the MCO has
proven itself to be of considerable heuristic value (e.g., anatomical
structures are proﬁtably investigated as if they were mechanical
contrivances), as well as of some limited rhetorical use (e.g., biology
students learn aboutmetabolic processes by visualizing the cell as a
miniature biochemical factory), it is far less obvious that the MCO
provides an adequate theory of living systems (Kirschner, Gerhart,
& Mitchison, 2000; Lewontin, 2000a; Rosen, 1991; Woese, 2004).
From a theoretical perspective, the adequacy of the MCO relies on
establishing a clear ontological correspondence between organisms
and machines. Of course, we know that Descartes himself saw no
problems in assimilating organisms to machines, as for him all that
was natural was also mechanical, and consequently any differences
between animals and man-made artifacts were purely quantitative
rather than qualitative (Des Chene, 2001; Vaccari, 2008). But as
today we are no longer bound by the stringent metaphysical
commitments of seventeenth-century mechanicist natural philos-
ophy, what do we actually ﬁnd when we compare organisms and
machines?
In previous work (Nicholson, 2013) I have argued at length that
despite some interesting similarities, organisms and machines are
fundamentally different kinds of systems. Although both organisms
and machines operate towards the attainment of particular
endsdthat is, both are purposive systemsdthe former are intrin-
sically purposive whereas the latter are extrinsically purposive. A
machine is extrinsically purposive in the sense that it works to-
wards an end that is external to itself; that is, it does not serve its
own interests but those of its maker or user. An organism, on the
other hand, is intrinsically purposive in the sense that its activities
are directed towards the maintenance of its own organization; that
is, it acts on its own behalf. The intrinsic purposiveness of organ-
isms is grounded on the fact that they are self-organizing, self-
producing, self-maintaining, and self-regenerating. Conversely, the
extrinsic purposiveness of machines is grounded on the fact that
they are organized, assembled, maintained, and repaired by
external agents. Even though machines and organisms both exhibit
organized complexity and structural integrity, in a machine the
parts are causally independent of, and temporally antecedent to,
thewhole they constitute. Although the parts acquire their function
by virtue of being present in the machine as a whole, they retain
their own distinctive properties regardless of whether or not they
are integrated in the whole. By contrast, the parts in an organismare neither causally independent of, nor temporally antecedent to,
the whole they constitute. Instead, they exist in a relation of col-
lective interdependence, relying on one another for their genera-
tion, maintenance, and renewal. An organism maintains its
integrity and autonomy as a whole by regulating, repairing, and
regenerating its parts, whereas a machine relies on outside inter-
vention not just for its construction and assembly, but also for its
maintenance and repair.
Because organisms and machines differ fundamentally in their
internal organizational dynamics, the MCO fails to provide an
appropriate theoretical understanding of what living systems are.
Nevertheless, despite its increasingly apparent shortcomings as a
biological theory, the MCO continues to exert a dominant inﬂu-
ence on how biologists think about living systems. The reason is
that the MCO is so deeply engrained in the minds of many bi-
ologists that it has more or less faded into the background,
becoming a tacit, higher-order assumption that frames more
speciﬁc, local projects in different areas of biology. In this respect,
the MCO constitutes what Konopka (2002, p. 398) calls a ‘grand
metaphor’ and Ruse (2010, p. 24) dubs a ‘root metaphor’, that is, a
metaphor so pervasive that it gives rise to ancillary ‘submetaphors’
that shape the form explanations take in particular ﬁelds of
inquiry.
This paper extends the philosophical critique of the MCO pre-
sented in Nicholson (2013) by critically analyzing the remarkably
disparate ways in which the MCO manifests itself in two major
areas of biology: development and evolution. In developmental
biology, the MCO is primarily instantiated by the genetic program
model of ontogeny, whereas in evolutionary biology it is
embodied in the idea of design and the related conception of
natural selection as an engineer. Although the concepts of genetic
program and design have received considerable attention by bi-
ologists and philosophers in recent years, what has not been
sufﬁciently recognized is that these notions are in fact sub-
metaphors of the MCO. The justiﬁcation of their postulation stems
from a tacit, uncritical acceptance of the MCO. This is of para-
mount importance because it is only by realizing that they
constitute different instantiations of the MCO that we can truly
understand why these notions prove to be so problematic upon
close examination. Exposing their connection to the MCO will
enable us to bring together under a uniﬁed theoretical perspective
the array of difﬁculties that arise when these submetaphors are
interpreted theoretically. In turn, this will provide powerful
additional reasons for dispensing with the MCO as a general
theory of living systems.
2. The MCO in developmental biology
Since the seventeenth century, the phenomenon of embryo-
logical development has constituted one of the most formidable
challenges for mechanicists who, following Descartes, have wanted
to advance biological understanding using the MCO as a theoretical
foundation. It is not difﬁcult to see why. Organisms and machines
come into existence by radically different means. A machine comes
into being by the assembly of pre-existing components. An or-
ganism does not. In an organism, the existence of the parts does not
precede that of the whole. Organismic parts only acquire their
respective identities qua parts as the whole progressively develops
from an originally undifferentiated yet already integrated system.
Embryogenesis is a ‘top-down’ process, whereas machine assembly
is decidedly ‘bottom-up’.
Faced with such a fundamental disparity, the early mechanicists
dealt with the problem of developmental differentiation by simply
ignoring it. Rather than considering how novel morphological
structures emerge progressively during ontogeny, they postulated
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miniature form as a ‘homunculus’ in either the egg or the sperm,
where it remains in an inert state awaiting activation through
fertilization. Upon this event, the germ is set into a growth phase
and gradually expands until it acquires its ﬁnal size. In this view,
the process of development consists simply in the mechanical
enlargement of the adult structure already articulated in the germ.
This is the doctrine of preformation, and for a long time it provided
the only means of reconciling descriptions of organismic develop-
ment with the explanatory principles of mechanicist natural phi-
losophy (Roe, 1981; Smith, 2006). Eventually, increasingly detailed
observations of embryogenesis in the nineteenth century ruled out
crude preformationist hypotheses as plausible explanations, but
preformationist thinking was never really purged from develop-
mental biology (see, e.g., Hertwig, 1900).
The situation changed considerably in the mid-twentieth
century with the advent of modern computing and the intro-
duction of the conceptual distinction between software and
hardware. This theoretical innovation enabled the construction of
a new kind of machine, the computer, which contains algo-
rithmic sequences of coded instructionsdor programsdthat are
executed by a central processing unit. In a computer, the soft-
ware is totally independent from the hardware that runs it. A
program can be transferred from one computer and run in
another. Moreover, the execution of a program is always carried
out in exactly the same fashion, regardless of the number of
times it is run and of the hardware that runs it. The computer is
thus a machine with Cartesian and Laplacian overtones. It is
Cartesian because the software/hardware distinction echoes the
soul/body dualism: the computer has an immaterial ‘soul’
(the software) that governs the operations of a material ‘body’
(the hardware). And it is Laplacian because the execution of a
program is completely deterministic and fully predictable, at
least in principle. These and other features made the computer a
very attractive theoretical model for those concerned with
elucidating the role of genes in development in the early days of
molecular biology.1
It is in this context that one of the most inﬂuential instantiations
of the MCO in modern biology came into being, namely the meta-
phor of the ‘genetic program’. This notion, proposed simulta-
neously by Jacob and Monod (1961) and Mayr (1961), ‘has come to
be widely regarded as a fundamental explanatory concept for
biological developmentdif not the fundamental concept’ (Keller,
2000a, p. 74). In explaining the motivations for its formulation,
Jacob (1973, p. 9) plainly acknowledged the link to the MCO: ‘The
programme is a model borrowed from electronic computers. It
equates the genetic material of an egg with the magnetic tape of a
computer’. According to Jacob, ‘everything urges one to compare
the logic of heredity to that of a computer. Rarely has a model
suggested by a particular epoch proved to be more faithful’ (Jacob,1 Even before DNA was conclusively identiﬁed as the hereditary material, Erwin
Schrödinger in his short book What is Life? had already characterized the chro-
mosome as a structure bearing a ‘code-script’ for the architecture of the organism.
Interestingly, the Laplacian connotations of the metaphor had not escaped him: ‘It
is these chromosomes [.] that contain in some kind of code-script the entire
pattern of the individual’s future development and of its functioning in the mature
state. [.] In calling the structure of the chromosome ﬁbres a code-script we mean
that the all-penetrating mind, once conceived by Laplace, to which every causal
connection lay immediately open, could tell from their structure whether the egg
would develop, under suitable conditions, into a black cock or into a speckled hen,
into a ﬂy or a maize plant, a rhododendron, a beetle, a mouse or a woman. [.] But
the term code-script is, of course, too narrow. The chromosome structures are at the
same time instrumental in bringing about the development they foreshadow. They
are law-code and executive powerdor, to use another simile, they are architect’s
plan and builder’s craftdin one’ (Schrödinger, 1944, pp. 22e23).1973, p. 265). Mayr (1982, p. 55) was no less explicit: ‘All organisms
possess a historically evolved genetic program, coded in the DNA of
the nucleus of the zygote [.] Nothing comparable to it exists in the
inanimate world, except for manmade computers’. In Mayr’s (1997,
p. 123) words, ‘the genetic program is the underlying factor of
everything organisms do. It plays a decisive role in laying down the
structure of an organism, its development, its functions, and its
activities’.
The idea that organisms contain a genetic program that de-
termines development in the same way that the operations of a
computer are determined by its programs captured biologists’
imagination almost immediately after its formulation (see, e.g.,
Blow, 1962). It introduced a new way of thinking about develop-
ment that resonated strongly which recent advances in computer
science, and which offered signiﬁcant advantages over earlier
models of gene action. More importantly, it appeared to make
conceptual sense of new ﬁndings about gene regulation (Keller,
2000a). As a result, the genetic program model became central to
the organization of research into the molecular basis of develop-
ment in the 1960s and 1970s. Sydney Brenner, for instance, who
spearheaded the use of the worm Caenorhabditis elegans as a model
organism, sought to establish the causal link between genes and
behaviour by uncovering the logical structure of the developmental
computations performed by the worm’s nervous system according
to the speciﬁcations of its genetic program (de Chadarevian, 1998).
More recently, the discovery of gene rearrangements, nested
genes, alternative promoters, alternative splicing, RNA editing,
frameshifting, alternate stop codons, and various other post-
transcriptional and post-translational processing mechanisms
have complicated the straightforward view of genes as ‘code-
scripts’ for phenotypic traits (but see Brenner, 2012). This has
prompted the extension of the program metaphor so as to
encompass not only the DNA sequences that code for transcription
and translation but also those that are recognized by binding fac-
tors during gene expression (i.e., enhancers, promoters, activator
and repressor binding sites, etc.). In turn, this has led to the notion
of ‘gene regulatory networks’ (GRNs, hereafter), which ‘control
expression of the genes required to execute each developmental
episode’ (Davidson, McClay, & Hood, 2003, p. 1475). GRNs provide
the source code for development, as they are ‘where the logic in-
structions that encode development physically reside’ (Davidson,
2009a, p. 248). The rise of GRN biology has served to strengthen
the popularity of the genetic program model. Indeed, Eric David-
sondwidely recognized as the leading GRN researcherdexplicitly
deﬁnes development as ‘the execution of the genetic program for
construction of a given species of organism’ (Davidson, 2006,
p. 16).
Today, the genetic program is everywhere. It appears in biology
textbooks, such as when organisms are said to be ‘governed by the
laws of physics and chemistry as well as a genetic program’
(Hartwell, Hood, Goldberg, & Silver, 2011, p. 3). It is present in the
technical literature, such as when claims are made that ‘a cell can
be seen as a computer (a machine expressing a program)’ (Danchin,
2009, p. 3). And it is also prominently featured in works of popular
science. In one of the most memorable phrases of Richard Dawkins’
hugely inﬂuential The Selﬁsh Gene, organisms are described as
‘survival machinesdrobot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve
the selﬁsh molecules known as genes’ (Dawkins, 1976, p. x, my
emphasis). Even some philosophers of biology, who should prob-
ably know better, have enthusiastically defended the reality of the
genetic program:
[T]he genes program the embryo in the same way that the
hardware in an automobile assembly plant’s robots’ central
processing units realize a program that enable them to weld
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any human can perform this task. This latter thesis requires no
philosophical defense. It is obvious to any onewho examines the
available accounts of the embryological development of, say, the
Drosophila. (Rosenberg, 2005, p. 345)
Before turning to consider the numerous difﬁculties with the
genetic program model, let us brieﬂy review the reasons why it
has proven to be such an attractive notion. First of all, being an
instantiation of the MCO, the genetic program metaphor appeals
directly to our everyday familiarity with machines. Supposing
that embryological development is governed by a program is
quite reasonable, according to Nijhout (1990, p. 443), because ‘we
would have designed such a system that way’.2 Another reason is
that it captures our intuitions about development rather well,
particularly the regularity, reliability, and orderliness of the
process. A further reason is that it provides a ﬁrm foundation
upon which to anchor other theoretical postulates, such as the
‘central dogma’ of molecular biology. It even serves to unify the
two major branches of biology Mayr distinguishes: proximate
biology and ultimate (or evolutionary) biology. ‘Proximate causes
have to do with the decoding of the program of a given indi-
vidual; evolutionary causes have to do with the changes of ge-
netic programs through time, and with the reasons for these
changes’ (Mayr, 1982, p. 68). Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, it subjugates the intimidating complexity of embryogen-
esis by placing the entire explanatory burden on a relatively
stable, epistemically tractable entity: a one-dimensional digital
code that can be replicated, modiﬁed, and transplanted from one
individual to another. In this way, the genetic program reduces
the thorny problem of ontogeny to the characterization of a set of
instructions that dictate the production of the body.
The most serious problem with the genetic program model of
development is that it is logically incoherent. To understand why
this is so, let us consider again the inadequacy of the organism-
machine analogy that grounds the MCO (and by implication the
genetic program metaphor as well). As we saw in the Introduction
(see Nicholson, 2013 for a full analysis), organisms are intrinsically
purposive whereas machines are extrinsically purposive. This
distinction reﬂects, among other things, the fact that organisms
organize and produce themselves, whereas machinesdincluding
computersdare organized and assembled by external agents. As
we will now see, this essential difference renders the theoretical
transposition of the software/hardware distinction from computer
science onto developmental biology inappropriate and misleading,
if not altogether nonsensical.
Recall that, in a computer, the hardware (the material parts of
the machine such as circuits, disks, and wiring) and the software
(the various programs that are executed by the machine) are totally
independent. The machinery of a computer must already be
assembled by an external agent before a program can be run on
itdit is not itself a product of the program. Now compare this to
what happens in development. Here, the output of the program is
the organism itself. This means that the software (the genetic
program) is responsible for producing and assembling the hard-
ware (the organism). Yet throughout this process, it is the devel-
oping organism itself that has to be executing the program. In other
words, the hardware runs the software whilst the software is2 Stubbleﬁeld (1986, p. 142) goes further, contending that it would have been
impossible to understand the molecular basis of development prior to the invention
of computers because ‘[w]e needed computers [.] to experience the complex
problem of programming a logic machine before we could be able to recognize such
an apparatus in cells’.simultaneously generating the hardware! Thus, thinking about the
relation between software and hardware in the context of devel-
opment leads to a paradox, as the genetic program requires its own
output to be executed (Coen, 1999, chap. 1).3
In addition to being conceptually inconsistent, the widespread
adoption of the genetic program metaphor has been directly
responsible for the legitimation and dissemination of three deeply
problematic theses concerning the role of genes in development.
These are:
(a) Genetic animism: genes initiate, direct, and control the
developmental process
(b) Neo-preformationism: developmental information is encoded
in the genes
(c) Developmental computability: complete knowledge of how
genes interact during development will enable us to
‘compute the embryo’.
Let us examine the difﬁculties with each of these theses in turn.
The problem with genetic animism is that it implies an attribution
of causal agency to genes that they simply do not possess on their
own. It is difﬁcult to see how genes could be responsible for initi-
ating and directing the execution of the developmental process
given that DNA is not an inherently active molecule, but rather
requires activation from without. Indeed, without the highly
structured cellular environment, DNA is inert, relatively unstruc-
tured, and non-functional. In spite of this, genetic animism lan-
guage pervades both the technical and popular genetics literature.
As Lewontin poignantly observes:
Genes are said to be ‘self-replicating,’ they engage in ‘gene ac-
tion,’ they ‘make’ proteins, they are ‘turned on’ or ‘turned off’ by
‘regulatory’DNA. But none of this is true. Genes are certainly not
‘self-replicating.’ New DNA strands are synthesized by a com-
plex cell machinery (another metaphor!) consisting of proteins
that use the old DNA strands as templates. We do not speak of
manuscripts ‘self-replicating’ in a photocopy machine. Genes
‘do’ nothing, they ‘make’ nothing, they cannot be ‘turned on’ or
‘turned off’ like a light or a water tap, because no energy or
material is ﬂowing through them. DNA is among the most inert
and nonreactive of organic molecules (Lewontin, 2000b, pp.
xiiexiii).
Genetic animism promotes the misunderstanding that DNA
stands in contradistinction to the rest of the components in a cell
by virtue of its ability to exert executive power over cellular op-
erations. In reality DNA is only functional when it is embedded in
the context of an already present, intricately organized cell. It is
only in the presence of a pre-existing cellular apparatus that any
talk of ‘gene action’ can even make sense. And what is more, the
origin of that cellular apparatus cannot be traced back to the genes.
Though DNA provides a template of one-dimensional information
for the amino acid sequence of proteins, many cellular structures
such as membrane-bound organelles, as well as the plasma
membrane itself, are the only template for their own replication;
that is, they are the only source of ‘information’ for their own three-3 Of course, one could avoid the paradox by reformulating the concepts of soft-
ware and hardware so that it was no longer necessary to theoretically conceive
them as separate entities (as they are understood in computer science). The trouble
with going down this route is that it would require giving up the very properties
that make computers distinctive in the ﬁrst place, thereby defeating the whole
purpose of using computers to shed light on development.
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they are always already present (Moss, 1992, 2002).4
Despite what the genetic program metaphor suggests, genes do
not initiate, direct, or control development (or any other process,
for that matter). When biologists speak of genes in that way, a close
examination of the speciﬁc empirical details usually sufﬁces to
dispel the validity of such characterizations. For example, the
‘eyeless’ gene of Drosophila melanogaster was famously described
by its discoverers as ‘a master control gene for eye morphogenesis’
(Halder, Callaerts, & Gehring, 1995, p. 1792). They had found that
the expression of this gene appeared to be responsible for trig-
gering a massive cascade of molecular reactions that ultimately
results in the formation of eyes.5 This is what prompted them to
refer to it as a ‘master control gene’. However, as Burian (2005, pp.
221e225) has pointed out, they could just as well have described it
as a ‘switch gene’ (i.e., a gene whose expression sets off a cascade of
events). There was no need to resort to such theoretically (and
ideologically) loaded languagedespecially considering the fact that
‘genetic switches’ are often activated by environmental stimuli.
Such genetic animism tropes, stemming as they do from the Car-
tesian soul/body dualism connotations of the software/hardware
distinctionwe noted earlier, are unnecessary and unhelpful, as they
only serve to mislead other biologists (and the public at large)
about the actual role genes play in development.
The thesis of neo-preformationism is expressed every time bi-
ologists say that genes ‘code for’ phenotypic traits; a claim that is
substantiated only by atypical, pathological cases in which the
complexities of the genotype-phenotype map can be effectively
ignored. It is also manifested when developmental biology is
described as ‘the study of how information in the genome is
translated into adult structure’ (Maynard Smith, 2000, p. 177).6
Neo-preformationism is implicit even in the use of the term
‘development’, which is itself a metaphor that carries with it a prior
commitment to the nature of the process it designates. The word
‘development’ tends to refer to the unfolding or unrolling of
something that is already present; a making manifest of what is
already immanent. What is reﬂected in the modern biological us-
age of ‘development’ (as opposed to the older Aristotelian term
‘generation’) is a tacit endorsement of the view that the ontogeny
of an organism is speciﬁed and determined by its constitution
(Lewontin, 2000a, p. 5).
The term ‘neo-preformationism’ of course alludes to the early
modern mechanicist doctrine we discussed at the start of this
section, which postulated that a miniature version of the fully
formed adult is encased in the germ. Neo-preformationism is more
subtle: the organism is not preformed in the germ, but the infor-
mation that programs its development is preformed in its genes.74 The implication of this is that genes cannot be regarded as the sole transmitters
of information from parent to offspring. Membranes and organelles, basal bodies
and microtubule organizing centres, are all inherited as well. Changes in these
epigenetic elements cause heritable variation in the cellular phenotype. They
therefore constitute additional, epigenetic inheritance systems (Jablonka & Lamb,
2005).
5 Subsequent work has demonstrated that a suite of genes are in fact required,
collectively, to initiate eye development in Drosophila (Fernald, 2004).
6 In this respect, neo-preformationism provided a key incentive for undertaking
the Human Genome Project, which was carried out under the explicit assumption
that ‘[t]he collection of chromosomes in the fertilized egg constitutes the complete
set of instructions for development, determining the timing and details of the
formation of the heart, the central nervous system, the immune system, and every
other organ and tissue required for life’ (DeLisi, 1988, p. 488).
7 As Davidson (2009b, p. R217) indicates in relation to the older preformationist
tradition, ‘No, the organism is not pre-formed in the head of the sperm, but the
head of the sperm and the egg nucleus do carry an immensely complex, species-
speciﬁc, regulatory program for the stepwise process of embryonic development’.The genome is thus assumed to contain all the information
required to specify the phenotypic outcome of development. One
disturbing consequence of neo-preformationism is that it elimi-
nates the need for real developmental biology (Grifﬁths
& Neumann-Held, 1999). If developmental information is really
encoded in a genetic program, the intricacies of the embryological
process are of little importance. All that one needs to know is
already in the DNA.
The problem with neo-preformationism is that the information
required for making an organism is not actually preformed in the
DNA. Instead, it emerges progressively through the dynamic
interaction of DNA with proteins, metabolites, and other cellular
components, as well as with the cellular, extracellular, and extra-
organismic environments (Grifﬁths & Knight, 1998; Oyama, 2000;
Oyama, Grifﬁths, & Gray, 2001). Ontogeny is not the gradual
unfolding of the organism from a predetermined genetic program,
as the very term ‘development’ misleadingly suggests. It is a highly
dynamic and heterogeneous process involving the conﬂuence of
numerous intersecting causal factors, only some of which have
their physical basis in the organism’s genome.
The propensity to neglect the crucial role of the environment in
shaping developmental outcomes is another consequence of
assimilating the development of an organism to the programmed
operation of a computer. In a computer, the independence of soft-
ware and hardware means that the same program is always
executed in exactly the sameway regardless of the system that runs
it. In contrast, when organisms with a similar genotype ﬁnd
themselves in dissimilar environments they tend to develop
differently. This is because the developmental deployment of ge-
netic material is highly sensitive to external conditions. The path
from genotype to phenotype is mediated by the environment. The
genotype does not specify a unique outcome of development but
rather stipulates a norm of reactiondthat is, a pattern of different
developmental outcomes across different environments that forms
the basis of the phenotypic plasticity displayed by all organisms
(Pigliucci, 2001). The consequence of this is that development must
be conceived as a process of construction involving the interaction
of the internal milieu of the organism with the external milieu in
which it ﬁnds itself in.
Finally, the thesis of developmental computability articulates
the Laplacian expectation implicit in the genetic programmetaphor
by holding that an embryo could in principle be computed from the
complete dataset of a fertilized egg.8 The question of computability
was famously posed by Lewis Wolpert in an essay titled ‘Do we
understand development?’, where he wrote:
Over the past 20 years, progress in developmental biology has
been so dramatic that developmental biologists may be excused
for having the view, possibly an illusion, that the basic principles
are understood, and that the next 20 years will be devoted to
ﬁlling in the details. [.] So we can begin to ask questionsdlike
whether the egg is computable.Will the egg be computable? That
is, given a total description of the fertilized eggdthe total DNA
sequence and the location of all proteins and RNAdcould one
predict how the embryowill develop? This is a formidable task, for
it implies that in computing the embryo, it may be necessary to
compute the behavior of all the constituent cells. It may, how-
ever, be feasible if a level of complexity of description of cell8 It is interesting to note that Descartes already anticipated this deterministic
thesis in his unﬁnished writings on embryology, where he postulated that ‘if one
had a good knowledge of all the parts of the seed of some species of a particular
animal, man for example, one could deduce from this alone, by entirely certain and
mathematical arguments, every shape and structure of each of its bodily parts’
(Descartes, 1998, p. 200).
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opment but that does not require each cell’s detailed behavior to
be taken into account. (Wolpert, 1994, p. 270, my emphasis)
One of those who took on Wolpert’s ‘formidable task’ was
Bodnar (1997), who brought together a large array of experimental
ﬁndings of gene interactions during Drosophila development in a
computational model that could simulate the ontogenic process in
a personal computer. Bodnar showed that most of the genes that
regulate speciﬁc morphogenetic pathways can be represented as
Boolean switches, which can be ‘on’ or ‘off’ depending on whether
concentrations of certain transcription factors are above or below a
certain threshold. Bodnar then generalized a series of switching
rules that compute the hierarchical cascades of gene activation
actually observed in living Drosophila embryos. Davidson’s work on
the GRNs of the sea urchin embryo shares with Bodnar the goal of
uncovering ‘the logic instructions that encode development’
(Davidson, 2009a, p. 248) by identifying the sequence of Boolean
rules that describe the general patterns of gene regulation during
embryogenesis. Ultimately, the aim is the same: to show how each
stage in development may be construed as an algorithmic function
of the immediately prior step, thereby opening the possibility of
eventually computing the entire developmental process from
initial conditions (cf. Rosenberg, 2006, chap. 2).
The trouble with developmental computability is that it mis-
interprets our ability to depict certain patterns of developmental
gene expression in terms of Boolean functions in a computer as
empirical proof that genes really do execute a deterministic pro-
gram for development that can be deciphered and used to compute
the embryo. It is a ﬂagrant (even if convenient) idealization to
characterize gene expression in terms of Boolean functions, given
that transcriptiondlike every other molecular event in the celldis
a noisy, probabilistic affair (Kaern, Elston, Blake, & Collins, 2005; Raj
& van Oudenaarden, 2008). Stochastic ﬂuctuations lie at the heart
of all gene interactions, and their effects are ampliﬁed in regulatory
cascades. Stochasticity even inﬂuences cell fate decisions (Losick &
Desplan, 2008). Developmental ‘instructions’ thus reﬂect stochastic
probabilities, not deterministic mandates. Developmental
computability is an illusion; its commitment to Laplacian deter-
minism is incommensurable with the fundamentally probabilistic
character of the molecular and cellular processes that underlie
development.
Note that developmental computability presupposes the reality
of the genetic program and the acceptance of the MCO more
generally. It is because organisms are conceived as machines that
the question of developmental computability is theoretically
meaningful. As Rosenberg remarks, ‘the thesis that the embryo is
computable from macromolecules alone will not even be contro-
versial among biologists’ because ‘[a] mathematical function is
computable if a machine can execute it. The system which builds
the embryo out of macromolecules is a machine, albeit one cobbled
together by natural selection. Accordingly there is a computable
function that this machine implements’ (Rosenberg, 1997, pp. 449e
450). It is quite revealing that the underlying question of whether
organisms really are machines is not even considered. In formu-
lating the developmental computability thesis, the MCO is simply
taken for granted.
In light of the problems with the three theses we have just
discussed, together with the logical incoherence of the metaphor
itself, it is clear that the genetic program does not convey an
adequate understanding of ontogeny. Some have tried to salvage
the organism-computer analogy from the defects of the genetic
program model by suggesting that the program for development is
not inscribed in the DNA but is rather distributed throughout thefertilized egg as a whole. This alternative instantiation of the MCO,
the so-called developmental program model, has signiﬁcant ad-
vantages over its better-known contender. Interestingly, its usage
dates as far back as that of the genetic program, and, as Keller
(2000b) has insightfully observed, one can even derive it from
some of the canonical formulations of the latter concept. For
instance, Jacob’s (1973, p. 9) famous claim that the program model
‘equates the genetic material of an egg with the magnetic tape of a
computer’ does not necessarily imply that the genetic material
encodes a program; it might just as well be thought of as encoding
data that is retrieved by a cellular program. Although the notion of a
developmental program surfaced repeatedly through the 1960s
(e.g., Apter, 1966), by the 1970s it had all but disappeared from the
biological discourse, leaving the genetic program as the dominant
paradigm in developmental biology (Keller, 2000b).
However, over the past twenty-ﬁve years the developmental
program model has experienced a revival, as the difﬁculties with
locating the developmental instructions in the genome have
become increasingly apparent. This has led to the view that the
genome constitutes a database of informational content that is
accessed at various times whilst the program for devel-
opmentddistributed across the cellular components that tran-
scribe and process DNAdis running (e.g., Atlan & Koppel, 1990;
Dupré, 2005; Noble, 2006). The merit of the developmental pro-
grammetaphor is that it avoids overstating the developmental role
of genes by construing them not as active agents but as passive
repositories of informational content that the organism can draw
upon. In viewing the genome as a data storage device, the devel-
opmental programmodel highlights a feature of DNA that is all too
often neglected, namely its remarkable chemical stability.
Although the developmental program is undoubtedly a more
appealing metaphor than the genetic program, it is still susceptible
to the general difﬁculties that arise when we think of ontogeny as
the execution of a program. As we remarked earlier in our discus-
sion, amajor reason for biologists’ infatuationwith ‘program-talk’ is
that it evokes rather effectively the regularity, reliability, and
orderliness of the developmental process. But are these attributes
sufﬁcient to license the use of program-talk? Clearly they are not. If
they were, we would also speak of the Earth being programmed to
orbit around the sun. The proper use of program-talk implies more
than this. It implies, speciﬁcally, the existence of a code and a set of
instructions that must be followed in a precise temporal sequence.
The problem is that this condition is far too restrictive to be
applicable to what happens in development. The execution of a
program invariably leads to the same output because the same exact
sequence of steps is followed each and every time. In contrast,
development invariably leads to the same outcome (a fully formed
organism) despite wide-ranging differences in the number, order,
and kind of molecular events that collectively bring about the
process. Embryogenesis is much too complex andmuch too reliable
in its outcome to be speciﬁed by a program. If development were a
program, the fertilized egg (not to mention the genome) would
never succeed in computing its output. John Dupré offers an anal-
ogy that nicely illustrates this point:
If I ask someone to go to the shop and buyme a loaf of bread, and
they agree, I am fairly conﬁdent that the outcome will be as I
intend. If I provide a deterministic programmedtake 12 paces
north-west, raise hand, turn knob, push, etc., there are toomany
unanticipated interventions that can derail the process for me to
have much hope of success. (Dupré, 2005, p. 206)
The extreme ﬁdelity and robustness of ontogeny is not the result
of the execution of an algorithmic sequence of predetermined
steps. Each developmental ‘step’ is not computed from the
9 Signs of Paley’s inﬂuence are perceptible throughout Darwin’s writings. For
example, in Natural Theology Paley draws an extended analogy between a telescope
and the eye, asserting that ‘there is precisely the same proof that the eye was made
for vision, as there is that the telescope was made for assisting it’ (Paley, 2006
[1802], p. 16). When Darwin discusses the eye in On the Origin of Species, he like-
wise marvels at the ‘extreme perfection’ of this optical ‘contrivance’, noting that it is
‘scarcely possible to avoid comparing [it] to a telescope’ (Darwin, 1859, p. 188).
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relies crucially on elaborate temporal and spatial relations between
molecules that are totally context-dependent. Development pro-
ceeds bymeans of intricate series of local interactions, not by global
control mechanisms, and embryonic form emerges as a conse-
quence of those interactions.
Fortunately, the program modeldin either its genetic or
developmental variantsdis not the only theoretical metaphor
available to developmental biologists. There are alternative meta-
phors not grounded in the MCO that offer interesting resources for
making conceptual sense of the nature of ontogeny. For example,
Coen (1999) proposes to conceptualize development as an act of
artistic creation. He points out that a painter does not attempt to
replicate a natural object by following a set of computable in-
structions. Rather, the painting emerges as the result of a highly
interactive process in which painter, materials, and environment
come together in a spontaneous creative event. Just as the artist
responds spontaneously, not only to thematerial (the texture of the
canvas, the quality of tools at hand) and the environment (the angle
of the lighting, its artiﬁciality or naturalness), but also to the
changing patterns of colour and shape as they emerge on the
evolving canvas, so the deployment of genetic material during
ontogeny is highly inﬂuenced by the environment in which the
organism ﬁnds itself thrown. More recently, Noble (2006) has
suggested a series of musical metaphors to conceptualize devel-
opment, viewing the growing embryo as a symphonic orchestra
with no conductor (no executive program directing the process)
interpreting (rather than computing) a genomic score composed by
natural selection.
It is likely that no metaphor can singlehandedly capture
embryogenesis in all its complexity. Perhaps an array of disparate
metaphors is needed to appropriately make sense of different as-
pects of the process. What is evident, at any rate, is that the MCO
submetaphor of the genetic program (as well as variants like the
developmental program) fails to provide an adequate framework
for conceptualizing development. As a theoretical model, it is un-
able to map the complex web of causal relations that link the ge-
notype to the phenotype. By conceiving embryos as computing
machines and borrowing concepts and terminology from computer
science, it gives biologists the illusion that they can predict and
control developmentdeven that they have already understood it.
But the genetic program does not explain development; it merely
black boxes it. By rejecting the MCO as a general theory of
living systems, developmental biology becomes liberated from
misleading analogies and ﬂawedmodels that encourage a distorted
understanding of what development is and how it takes place.
3. The MCO in evolutionary biology
The predominance of the MCO in modern biology has also had
far reaching consequences in evolutionary biology. In fact, it has
inﬂuenced the Neo-Darwinian understanding of evolution to such
an extent that some of the most prominent debates within evolu-
tionary theory over the past few decades have tacitly revolved
around the coherence, legitimacy, and applicability of the MCO.
This is all themore extraordinary in light of the fact that the original
Cartesian formulation of the MCO is fundamentally incompatible
with an evolutionary conception of organisms. Whereas the former
is ﬁrmly grounded in Christian theology, the latter is thoroughly
committed to a naturalistic metaphysics. To understand the Car-
tesian bête-machine, it is necessary to conceive it as being preceded,
logically and chronologically, by God. In this sense, Descartes’ MCO
leads naturally to the well-known ‘Argument from Design’. As or-
ganisms differ from machines only in terms of their superior
complexity, one can infer that just as the functional organization ofthe latter is the product of design, the functional organization of the
former must likewise be the result of design. And since the design
of organisms inﬁnitely surpasses that of machines, the intellect and
ingenuity of the designermust be inconceivably greater than that of
man. In this way, the MCO of mechanicist biology provided a
theoretical foundation for defending the existence of God, and
many philosophers and theologians, especially in Britain, used it to
this end during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Topham,
2010).
Perhaps the most famous example of the theological recourse to
the MCO is William Paley’s Natural Theology. In this work Paley
compared the intricate contrivances of machines like the watch to
the exquisite adaptations of organisms, and argued that the
apparent design of the latter attests to the intelligence and provi-
dence of a benevolent Creator. It is well known that Charles Darwin
practically memorized Paley’s Natural Theology while he was a
student at Cambridge, and that he was instilled thereafter with an
appreciation of the perfect adaptation of structure to function in
organisms.9 From the 1830s onwards, it became one of the major
objectives of his work to discover the basis of such wondrous
functional adaptation (Ospovat, 1981). With his theory of evolution
by natural selection, Darwin considered that he had provided an
alternative, naturalistic explanation of the organized complexity of
organisms. As hewould later remark in his autobiography, ‘[t]he old
argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly
seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural se-
lection has been discovered’ (Darwin,1908, p. 154). Darwin’s theory
presented a lethal blow to the MCO. Adaptations, the very features
of organisms that seemed to cry out for explanations in terms of
design, could now be accounted for by appealing to the operation of
natural processes like natural selection.
However, what is remarkabledparadoxical evendis that Dar-
win did not in fact succeed in expunging the MCO from biological
theory. Instead, what happened was that evolutionary biology itself
adapted to accommodate theMCO (see Nicholson, 2012). Ever since
Darwin, mechanical analogies, despite their obvious natural theo-
logical connotations, have continued to pervade the biological
discourse in general and the evolutionary discourse in particular.
Evolutionists do not even hesitate to invoke Paley’s own approach
to the study of adaptation as a model for contemporary evolu-
tionary biology. For example, Williams (1992, p. 190) considers that
Paley’s Natural Theology is ‘worth close attention by all biologists’
because it offers advice on how to identify the products of selection,
and even includes seven pages of Paley’s book as an appendix to his.
Dawkins (1998, p. 16) goes further, suggesting that present-day
evolutionists ‘might be labelled neo-Paleyists, or perhaps ‘trans-
formed Paleyists’’. Implicit in this methodological association with
natural theology is the view that in post-Darwinian biology, or-
ganisms, whilst being recognized as the products of natural selec-
tion rather than of divine creation, are still viewed as optimally-
designed machines in the exact same sense that Paleydand Des-
cartes for that matterdconceived them. Dawkins (1976, p. xxii) is
all too happy to conﬁrm this: ‘we animals are the most complicated
and perfectly-designed pieces of machinery in the known universe’.
As a consequence of this paradoxical situation, modern evolu-
tionary theory sits uncomfortably alongside a root metaphor (the
MCO) that fundamentally misrepresents the nature of the very
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more palpable than in the usage of a particularly seductive notion
imported from the realm of engineering, namely the concept of
design. For some, this submetaphor of the MCO constitutes the
central organizing idea of evolutionary theory. For example,
Michael Ruse, in his book Darwin and Design, openly declares that
‘[t]he metaphor of design, with the organism as artifact, is at the
heart of Darwinian evolutionary biology’ (Ruse, 2003, p. 266).
Gardner (2009, p. 862) similarly asserts that ‘Darwinism is really a
theory of organismal design’.
But what, we may ask, does the term ‘design’ actually mean?
One philosophical dictionary deﬁnes it as the deliberate production
of an object by an external agent so that it accomplishes a desired
purpose (Bunge, 2003). It is therefore a notion that serves to
characterize extrinsically purposive objects like machines, given
that the design of an object reﬂects the intentions of the external
agent (the designer) that are realized by the produced object. This is
something that even the staunchest defenders of the design met-
aphor in evolution acknowledge. Ruse, in the book mentioned
above, notes in relation to the design of a knife that ‘[t]he knife itself
hardly has the end of cutting.We have the end of cutting, and sowe
design and make the knife [to that end]’ (Ruse, 2003, p. 276, my
emphasis).
The trouble with design-talk in biology is that, as we have
already discussed, organisms are not extrinsically purposive ob-
jects. Their activities and operations do not serve the purposes of an
external agent. Instead, they are directed towards their own sur-
vival, that is, towards the conservation of their own organization
(again, see Nicholson, 2013 for a detailed articulation of this argu-
ment). Because of their self-producing, intrinsically purposive na-
ture, the concept of design is incapable of capturing the functional
organization of organisms, given that this functional organization
does not reﬂect the plan or intentions of an external agent (as it
does in machines). The common misconception that the structure
and behaviour of organisms is explicable in terms of extrinsic
purposes leads to the view that organisms have been genuinely
designed to function in a preordained way. This view is very
problematic.
For one thing, an organism cannot be designed for a function
because it does not itself have a functiondonly its parts do. The
reason for this is that the attribution of a function to an entity is
enabled by the fact that the beneﬁciary of its operation is an
external agent (McLaughlin, 2001). A machine has a function
because it operates in ways that serve the ends of its maker or user.
An organism does not have a function because it acts on its own
behalf and serves its own ends rather than those of an external
agent. The parts of organisms do have functions, however, because
in this case the beneﬁciary of their operation is an external agent,
namely the organism as a whole to which they belong. But even if
the ascription of design is restricted to the parts of an organism, it is
still wholly inappropriate because the attribution of a function to a
part of an organism does not entail design for that function (as is
the case for the parts of machines). This is because it is the or-
ganism itselfdand not some external maker or userdthat de-
termines the functionality of each part according to how it causally
contributes to the maintenance and perpetuation of the organiza-
tion of the organism as a whole (Christensen & Bickhard, 2002;
Collier, 2000; Edin, 2008; McLaughlin, 2001; Mossio, Saborido, &
Moreno, 2009; Schlosser, 1998). Functional adjudications need
not be grounded on extrinsically purposive notions like design.
Function and design are not mutually entailing concepts (cf. Weber,
2011).
Unfortunately, this is seldom recognized in the literature on
function and teleology. Tim Lewens, for instance, has written an
entire book on the role of the MCO in evolutionary biology with thetitle Organisms and Artifacts, but at no point does he even consider
the possibility that the purposiveness of a system may be intrinsic
as well as extrinsic. Consequently, he simply assumes that func-
tional language is of the same kind when it is applied to machines
as when it is applied to (the parts of) organisms. Hewrongly asserts
that
when organisms were considered to be artifacts made by God,
function language had the same meaning regardless of whether
one was talking about the function of a fork or a frog’s leg. It is
widely agreed that evolutionary biologists today use function
language in a strikingly similar way to how it was used by the
natural theologians. (Lewens, 2004, p. 13)
This mistaken belief has led philosophers to attempt to derive
the concept of function from the concept of design (e.g., Kitcher,
1993; Krohs, 2009; Millikan, 1984; Neander, 1991) or to derive
the concept of design from the concept of function (e.g., Allen &
Bekoff, 1995; Buller, 2002; Lauder, 1982), not realizing in either
case that the adjudication of functions in organisms and in ma-
chines has a very different basis. Simply put, in machines func-
tionality entails design, in organisms it does not. It is only by
assuming that organisms are machines that the attribution of
design on the basis of biological function makes conceptual
sense.
Despite being a concept that belongs to the domain of machines,
the term ‘design’ is quite liberally used in contemporary discussions
of evolution, to the extent that the process and products of evolu-
tionary change are characterized as ‘design without a designer’
(e.g., Ayala, 2004; Kitcher, 1993). This slogan is misleading because
the notion of design does not capture how Darwinian evolution
accounts for the functional organization of organisms. The adap-
tations produced by evolution are not the result of an intentional
preconceived plan by an external agent, but are rather the conse-
quence of the differential survival and reproduction of organisms
with heritable adaptive variations. It would be far more appropriate
to assert that organisms are ‘fashioned’ or ‘shaped’ by selection
pressures than to invoke design as an explanatory concept in
evolution (see Reiss, 2009).
Moreover, the very idea of ‘designwithout a designer’ is not only
deceptivedit is also logically contradictory: ‘design’ means made
by a designer. As Zammito (2006, p. 753) correctly observes, ‘[t]he
notion of design is ontologically parasitical upon a designer. There
can be no relative [or extrinsic] purposiveness [reﬂected in the
function of the designed product] without an intrinsic purpose
[referring to the intentions of the designer] to be served. The
analogy of design presumes the transparencydboth epistemolog-
ical and ontologicaldof human agency’. Matthen (1997, p. 32, fn.
14) is thus right to complain: ‘[t]his does not make sense to me:
‘design without a designer’ is still an unintuitive notion as far as I
am concerned, and [.] it goes against some inﬂuential ideas in
evolutionary biology’.
The principal reason why the notion of design pervades evolu-
tionary biology is that it is used uncriticallydtypically as shorthand
for functional organization (e.g., Ayala, 2004, p. 58). But in inferring
design from functional organization, modern-day evolutionists
inadvertently appeal to the ﬁrst part of the argument from design.
As we noted above, this ﬁrst argues inductively for design on the
basis of functional organization, and then argues deductively for a
designer on the basis of design. The fatal ﬂaw of this theological
argument, as was already showed by David Hume in his Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion, lies not in its deductive part (i.e.,
design / designer) but in its inductive one (i.e., functional
organization/ design), which itself derives, as does theMCO, from
the acceptance of the analogy between organisms and machines.
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necessarily evidence of design, he was not able to provide a causal
explanation for its origin and occurrence in organisms. This was
precisely Darwin’s accomplishment. Peter McLaughlin makes this
point crisply and clearly:
What Darwin has enabled us to do (that Hume could not) is not
to ‘think of designwithout a designer’, but rather to think of eyes
as being for seeing without presupposing that they are designed
for seeing. We do not think of a plan (design) without a planner
but of adaptation without intent (design). (McLaughlin, 2001,
p. 152)
Nevertheless, there is still an alternative left for evolutionists
unwilling to let go of the concept of design, which is to bite the
bullet and accept both the inductive and deductive parts of the
argument from design, and simply replace God with natural se-
lection as the designer. The appropriate slogan for evolution is
thus not ‘design without a designer’ but ‘design with a designer’.
According to this interpretation of Darwinism, the design of or-
ganisms is the work not of a divine watchmaker but of a blind
watchmaker (Dawkins, 1986; Dennett, 1995). However, this move
does not really help matters because evolution simply does not
proceed like a watchmaker, blind or otherwise. It is worth bearing
in mind that Darwin, having carefully read Paley, was fully aware
of the watchmaker analogy and yet chose not to resort to it in On
the Origin of Species. Rather, the analogy Darwin drew upon to
illustrate his theory of evolution was that of selection, of the kind
implemented by pigeon breeders.
Darwin’s choice of analogy is extremely signiﬁcant because
breeders and watchmakers proceed in totally different ways. The
watchmaker manipulates the internal parts of a watch (its gears
and springs) in order to affect the properties of the watch. The
breeder, on the other hand, manipulates the selective pressure on a
population of pigeons in order to affect the beaks and wings of
successive generations of pigeons. Selectiondboth natural and
artiﬁcialdis a process by which parts of a whole are preserved,
changed, or created as the long-term consequences of manipula-
tions carried out not on the parts themselves, but on the wholes to
which they belong. Thus, whereas the designer (such as a watch-
maker) manipulates parts to affect the properties of wholes, nature
(like a breeder) manipulates wholes to affect the properties of their
parts. It is therefore selection rather than design that Darwin
regarded as the correct metaphor to understand evolution, which is
why he chose to call the causal principle of his theory ‘natural se-
lection’ and not the ‘blind watchmaker’.
In spite of its inadequacy, the metaphorical conception of evo-
lution as the work of a blind watchmakerdwhich Godfrey-Smith
(1999, p. 190) ﬁttingly describes as ‘the tradition of natural theol-
ogy continued’dhas exerted considerable inﬂuence on modern
evolutionary biology. In fact, it lies at the heart of the excesses of the
adaptationist program famously criticized by Gould and Lewontin
(1979) in ‘The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian para-
digm’. Adaptationists are committed to the view that organisms,
like watches, can be effectively decomposed into discrete, mutually
independent traits, and that each of these traits is an adaptation,
optimally-designed for its function by the watchmaker, natural
selection.1010 The architects of the Modern Synthesis appear to have been divided on this
issue. While Huxley (1943, p. 420) asserted that ‘every organism cannot be other
than a bundle of adaptations’, Dobzhansky (1970, p. 65) emphasized that ‘[t]alking
about traits as though they were independent entities is responsible for much
confusion in biological and especially in evolutionary thought’ (see Depew, 2011).The problem with this adaptationist thesis is that there is no
single way of decomposing an organism into parts. This is
another reﬂection of the fundamental disanalogy between or-
ganisms and machines that makes the MCO such as a problematic
notion. One of the distinguishing features of a machine (for
instance, a watch) is that it is a composite entity. It is made up of
clearly deﬁned parts that interact to produce the behaviour of the
whole. These parts are both structurally independent of, and
temporally antecedent to, the whole they constitute given that a
machine always comes into existence by the assembly of pre-
existing components. An organism, on the other hand, does not
arise from the assembly of pre-existing components, as we dis-
cussed at the start of the previous section. The parts of an or-
ganism do not even exist qua parts prior to the existence of the
whole they constitute. As a result, there is no ‘objective’ or ‘cor-
rect’ way to carve an organism into parts. How an organism is
partitioned depends entirely on the particular epistemic ques-
tions one is interested in investigating.
So although some organs like the eye may display a degree of
functional modularity comparable to the components of a watch,
many other organismic structures cannot be demarcated in such a
manner because they contribute to the realization of a variety of
different functions within the organism. The traits of an organism
contribute to its ﬁtness in so many different ways that it makes
little sense to attempt to calculate their individual ﬁtness values, as
they have not been shaped independently by selection. The adap-
tationist assumes that nature selects traits of organisms for their
functions in the same way that a watchmaker selects parts of
watches for their functions. But the truth is that nature does not
select traits at all. It selects organisms with traits that functionally
contribute (in many different ways) to enhancing the ﬁtness of the
organisms to which they belong.
Another major problem with adaptationism is that it assumes
that the adaptations produced by natural selection are as optimal as
they can be given the trade-offs that need to be reached between
conﬂicting functional demands, as well as the inevitable architec-
tural constraints on organismic form. This belief in optimal adap-
tation is another consequence of the MCO submetaphor of natural
selection as a watchmaker, given that no watchmaker would
deliberately design a watch to display suboptimal components or
features. Instead, the watchmaker carefully chooses the gears,
springs, and levers to ensure that the watch is as functionally
effective as possible. In the same way, the adaptationist considers
that each part of an organism has been optimally engineered by
natural selection to contribute to the best possible design of the
organism as a whole. However, this view drastically overestimates
the power of natural selection. Natural selection does not produce
perfectly optimized adaptations, as Darwin (1859, p. 201) himself
recognized: ‘Natural selection tends only to make every organic
being as perfect as, or slightly more perfect than, the other in-
habitants in the same country with which it has to struggle for
existence. And we see that this is the degree of perfection attained
under nature’.
The adaptationists’ endorsement of the ‘design with a designer’
view of evolution is also exempliﬁed by their contention that nat-
ural selection is like an engineer that intentionally devises effective
‘solutions’ to the adaptive ‘problems’ presented by the environ-
ment.11 Accordingly, adaptationists study the adaptations of11 As Williams (1992, p. 40) explains: ‘[a]daptation is demonstrated by observed
conformity to a priori design speciﬁcations [.] The hand is an adaptation for
manipulation because if conforms in many ways to what an engineer would expect,
a priori, of manipulative machinery; the eye is an optical instrument because if
conforms to expectations for an optical instrument’.
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neering and adaptive thinking. Reverse engineering seeks to infer
the problems posed by an organism’s environment from the study
of observed organismic traits. Adaptive thinking reverses the di-
rection of inference and seeks to draw on known adaptive problems
faced by an organism to predict likely solutions that will have
emerged to meet those problems (Dennett, 1995, pp. 187e262;
Grifﬁths, 1996; Lewens, 2002).
The difﬁculty with the problem-solving interpretation of natural
selection is that problem-solving in general is an inherently goal-
directed process. It requires identifying a desired state in advance
and then specifying and following a route from the current state to
the desired state. Natural selection, however, does not proceed
prospectively towards the attainment of particular ends. The
various traits of an organism have not evolved in order to be able to
solve adaptive problems posed by the environment. Rather, they
are able to solve adaptive problems posed by the environment
because they have evolved. For example, the wings of a bird are not
the solution devised by natural selection to deal with the problem
of ﬂight, since half a wing provides no lift at all given the nonlin-
earity of aerodynamic relations. Rather, wings were initially
selected for their ability to carry out other functions (e.g., terrestrial
locomotion, predatory action, heat regulation, etc.) and only as they
grew larger were they incidentally found to also enable ﬂight,
thereby becoming subsequently selected for this purpose. As
Lewontin (1996, p. 8) eloquently puts it, ‘[i]f wings are a solution to
the problem of ﬂight, they are an example of a problem being
created by its own solution’.12
The recruitment of already existing structures for novel func-
tions is a common occurrence in evolution (Gould & Vrba, 1982),
and it runs counter to the metaphor of natural selection as an en-
gineer. Evolutionary change is constrained by the past history of
organisms, given that novelty can only arise on the basis of modi-
fying what already exists. In contrast, an engineer typically designs
machines de novo out of especially prepared components. This
difference was pointed out decades ago by François Jacob in a well-
known article called ‘Evolution and tinkering’:
[N]atural selection does not work as an engineer works. It works
like a tinkererda tinkerer who does not know exactlywhat he is
going to produce but uses whatever he ﬁnds around him
whether it be pieces of string, fragments of wood, or old card-
boards; in short it works like a tinkerer who uses everything at
his disposal to produce some kind of workable object. For the
engineer, the realization of his task depends on his having the
raw materials and the tools that exactly ﬁt his project. The
tinkerer, in contrast, always manages with odds and ends. What
he ultimately produces is generally related to no special project,12 It should be admitted that the MCO-derived metaphor of natural selection as an
engineer has not been single-handedly responsible for perpetrating the misun-
derstanding of evolution as a goal-directed, problem-solving process. The reason is
that the concept of ‘natural selection’ is itself a metaphor that does not completely
avoid the problematic presumption of intentionality. After all, selection is an
intentional act. Thus, in drawing the analogy with artiﬁcial selection, Darwin
inadvertently left open the possibility that his principle could be misconstrued as a
goal-directed agent that, like a breeder, intentionally, and with foresight, picks or
‘selects’ variations directed towards the maximization of organismic ﬁtness
(Blancke, Schellens, Soetaert, Van Keer, & Braeckman, 2014). This misleading
interpretation of natural selection has at times resulted in a crypto-
anthropomorphic view of the environment, which, understood as the natural
selector, poses adaptive problems that organisms must solve. Such misconceptions
can be avoided by keeping in mind that that the environment is not an indepen-
dent, quasi-transcendent entity with the power to mould organismic form ac-
cording to its demands (like a breeder or a watchmaker), but is rather partially
constructed by the activities of the organisms that inhabit it (Odling-Smee, Laland,
& Feldman, 2003).and it results from a series of contingent events. (Jacob, 1977, pp.
1163e1164)
Jacob’s analogy between evolution and tinkering is instructive
because it helps illustrate some of the major problems of the en-
gineer metaphor of natural selection we have discussed. For
example, whereas the engineer works prospectively according to a
preconceived plan or design, the tinkerer cannot know in advance
what precisely he is going to come up with. Moreover, whereas the
engineer builds machines by bringing together individually speci-
ﬁed components, the tinkerer has to make do with whatever
components happen to come his way. Finally, whereas the engineer
produces objects as perfect and efﬁcient as his technological re-
sources and understanding permit, the works of the tinkerer are far
from perfect; instead they are opportunistic and haphazard. Evo-
lution is indeed much more like tinkering than engineering.13
Overall, the host of problems that arise from appealing to the
metaphor of design in evolutionary biology can ultimately be
traced back to the fact that design, being a concept borrowed from
engineering, describes extrinsically purposive systems like ma-
chines, not intrinsically purposive ones like organisms. In light of
the misunderstandings that the adoption of this notion has caused,
it is rather surprising that it continues to contaminate evolutionary
thinking to the extent that it does. Ollason (1987, p. 243) poignantly
expressed this frustration when he stated that ‘the idea that ani-
mals are designed is dead, killed by Hume, buried, perhaps un-
wittingly by Darwin, but however comprehensively it is disposed
of, like the walking dead, it haunts us still’. The reason why the
metaphor of design still haunts evolution is that, despite its dis-
turbing theological connotations, it is ﬁrmly grounded in what is
still the most inﬂuential model of the organism: theMCO. Thus, it is
only by making explicit the rejection of the MCO that evolutionary
biology can ﬁnally lay the ghost of natural theology to rest and fully
come to terms with the actual implications of Darwin’s theory for
our understanding of organisms.
4. Conclusion
Science cannot be conducted without metaphors. They make
abstract ideas accessible and complex phenomena tractable, they
help generate empirical predictions, and they provide bridges be-
tween different areas of enquiry. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of
ametaphor depends on the appropriateness of the context inwhich
it is invoked. The choice of metaphor is critical, as it determines the
theoretical lens through which phenomena are conceptualized and
explained. Choosing an inappropriate metaphor can have very
unfortunate consequences, as it can inadvertently bias our under-
standing of the target domain and prevent us from seeing aspects of
it that may otherwise be perfectly obvious. Still, the ways in which
metaphors inﬂuence and even constrain scientiﬁc thinking are not
always perceptible. In fact, the more pervasive the metaphor, the
more covert its effects.
In this paper we have examined one of the most pervasive
metaphors in biology, the MCO. The reasons for its ubiquity are
readily apparent. Machines, being the products of human design,13 It is important to note, however, that not all forms of engineering are equally
well captured by the paradigmatic characterization offered by Jacob. Calcott (2014)
has recently drawn attention to the fact that software engineering is quite different
from mechanical engineering (which has traditionally been the source of most
engineering metaphors in evolutionary biology) and is in fact more akin to
tinkering. Software engineers tend to work by re-writing existing source
codedrather than devising it from scratchdand usually modify it in an open-
ended way so that it can be altered again in the future as new demands arise. It
is clear, then, that depending on the biological context being considered, metaphors
from some forms of engineering will be more misleading than others.
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Moreover, if organisms are machines, then the principles, concepts,
and methods of physics and engineering can be unproblematically
imported into biology. But perhaps most importantly of all,
conceiving an organism as a machine has historically meant to
conceive it in a way that enables it to be proﬁtably investigated.
This is because the very idea of a machine encapsulates precisely
that which is amenable to scientiﬁc analysis: an organized system
with regular and predictable behaviour, and whose workings can
be completely explained in terms of the structure and interactions
of its component parts. This is what has made the MCO such an
incredibly useful heuristic device throughout the history of biology.
The heuristic power of the metaphor has been augmented even
further by the fact that continued technological progress has fur-
nished biologists with an ever expanding array of machine models
to draw upon. The MCO takes remarkably different forms
depending on the biological phenomena being considered, and this
is precisely what our examination of development and evolution
reﬂects.
Having said this, we should not commit the mistake of
conﬂating heuristic usefulness with theoretical truthfulness, as
the former does not always entail the latter. The MCO is heu-
ristically useful because it reduces organisms to the features it is
capable of explaining and ﬁlters out everything that remains. The
success in explaining these selected features in turn helps rein-
force the original conceptualization of the organism as a machine.
The more complex or recalcitrant aspects of the organism that do
not ﬁt the MCO in any of its various forms are either ignored or
dismissed as unimportant. Unfortunately, what is neglected in the
MCO is precisely that which makes organisms most distinctive,
namely their intrinsic purposiveness and their internal organiza-
tional dynamics. As our analysis has shown, it is exactly these
features that render the epistemic transposition of the software/
hardware distinction into developmental biology unsuitable,
and it is also what makes the theoretical recourse to the concept
of design in the explanation of function and adaptation
inappropriate.
So although it is true that we can heuristically study differentia-
tion by depicting patterns of gene expression as if they were Boolean
functions in a computer program, this does not mean that develop-
ment actually proceeds as the programmed execution of an algo-
rithmic sequence of predetermined steps. In the sameway, although
it is true that we can heuristically study organismic traits as if they
were evolutionarysolutions to adaptiveproblems, this doesnotmean
that organisms actually evolve according to the design speciﬁcations
of a blindwatchmaker. An organismdoes not develop in theway that
a computer executes a program, nor does it evolve in theway that an
artifact is designed by an engineer. Both of these damaging mis-
conceptions, which preclude genuine understanding in develop-
mental and evolutionary biology, have their basis in the uncritical
acceptance of the MCO as a general theory of living systems.
It may be appropriate to end by drawing attention to the fact
that the problematic nature of the MCO as a biological theory has
long been recognized by theoretical biologists. As the late Robert
Rosen put it in his book Life Itself, the MCO ‘makes biology inﬁ-
nitely harder than it needs to be [.] because it transmutes
biology into a struggle to reconcile organic phenomena with sets
of constituent fragments of unknown relevance to them’ (Rosen,
1991, p. 22). Ludwig von Bertalanffy was even more forceful in his
condemnation of the MCO in his Modern Theories of Development
of 1933:
In the history of science and philosophy there is hardly a less
happy expression than that of the bête machine of Descartes. No
concept leads to such a distorted view of the problemunderlying it or so greatly falsiﬁes its proper meaning. It might
even be said that, in spite of its heuristic success, the notion of
the machine has had a destructive effect on the development of
biological theory. It has entangled the investigator even to-day
with scholastic artiﬁcial problems, and at the same time has
prevented the clear discernment of the essential problem of
organic nature. Only the displacement of the machine theory
[.] will put an end to the paralysis of biological thinking for
which this Cartesian expression has been responsible.
(Bertalanffy, 1933, pp. 36e37)
The ‘displacement of the machine theory’ that Bertalanffy
referred to eighty years ago has still not been accomplished, but it is
becoming harder and harder to dispute the fact that the MCO today
is obstructing rather than enabling theoretical progress in biology.
Breaking free from the historical grip of this seductive metaphor
constitutes a necessary precondition for coming to terms with the
nature of living systems.
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